The relationship between political theory, including the history of political thought, and International Relations theory, including the history of international thought has been, and to some extent remains, complex and troubled. On both sides of the Atlantic, the mid-twentieth century founders of International Relations as an academic discipline drew extensively on the canon of political thought, but approached the subject in an uncritical way, while political philosophers largely disdained the international as a focus. This changed in the 1970s and 80s, with the emergence of the 'justice industry' based on critiques of Rawls's A Theory of Justice and a consequent recovering of the past history of cosmopolitan and communitarian thought. A new discourse emerged in this periodinternational political theory -bridging the gap between political thought and international relations, and stimulating a far more creative and scholarly approach to the history of international thought. However, in a social science environment dominated by the methods of economics, that is formal theory and quantification, the new discourse of international political theory occupies a niche rather than existing at the centre of the discipline.
The purpose of this essay is to provide an extended commentary on these propositions and this paradox; in what follows it will be argued that the framing of this issue is broadly correct, but that once one digs deeper some problems arise, problems which require a reframing of some of the core elements of the way in which the relationship between International Relations theory and the history of political thought is to be understood. The elements of this reframing will be presented in summary form in this Introduction, and then defended at greater length.
First, it is indeed true that 'classical political thought has long been part of International Relations', but it is equally true that the account of 'classical political thought' that was customary until quite recently was, for the most part, crude, caricatured and un-nuanced; this was the case for both mid-century American Realists such as Hans Morgenthau and for early 'English School' writers such as Martin Wight.
Second, although there is some truth in the charge that 'questions of international relations today receive comparatively little attention' from historians of political thought, it is also true that other political theorists, especially of an analytical bent, do not neglect international issues. Historians of political thought have themselves become marginalised in the modern AngloAmerican academy, and their inattention to international issues may be a byproduct of their struggle to survive in a hostile environment.
Third, the relative dominance of analytical political theory in the Anglo-American academy is mirrored by the rise of neo-positivist, social choice thinking in Political Science and International Relations; this perspective is generally uninterested in history of any kind, but a subfield of International Relations theory opposed to the dominance of neo-utilitarianism has arisen, namely
International Political Theory and this new subfield is generally more engaged with the history of political thought.
Fourth, while the existence of International Political Theory has stimulated the emergence of contemporary historians of international political thought who have a far superior grasp of their subject than their predecessors in the discourse, they draw an audience for their work from a subfield of the discipline rather than from International Relations Theory as such. Unlike their 'historians of political thought' cousins, historians of international political thought fill a niche that it is widely believed ought to be filled, but they are indeed offering a niche product rather than contributing directly to the mainstream.
Fifth, in summary, we see that a shift has taken place. To oversimplify the story, fifty years ago scholars in the field were passionately concerned with the history of international thought, and indeed with international history in general, but their account of the classics did not stand up to close scrutiny. Now, there are numerous scholars of international political thought who have done the kind of in-depth textual analysis that earlier on was missing, but their place in the wider discipline is more problematic than used to be the case. Just at the point at which expertise on the history of international thought is at its zenith, a knowledge of the classics is no longer thought to be a necessity by the most influential modern scholars of either Political Science or International Relations.
The rest of this essay will fill out the arguments presented in shorthand above, but before proceeding to this task it is necessary to acknowledge two limitations; first, the focus here is on Anglo-American writers and the Anglo-American academy. Anglo-American in this context is defined as including anyone whose professional life is conducted mainly through the medium of English, thus including most North Europeans, but not including most Francophones. Very clearly a wholly different story could be told about the relationship between the history of political thought and the discourse of International Relations were the focus to be on France rather than the Anglo-American world. The two worlds are, of course, not hermetically sealed, there are post-structuralists in London and New York, Copenhagen and Berlin, and there are utilitarians in Paris, but nonetheless these worlds remain distinct, as a cursory survey of the key journals of Anglo-America will confirm -over the twenty-year history of the European Journal of International Relations, the lack of material therein from France, Italy or Spain has been a constant complaint of its host organisation, the European
Consortium of Political Research. Whether the new European International
Studies Association will bridge this gap remains to be seen. 
Political Thought and IR Theory in the Mid-Twentieth Century
The history of the discipline of International Relations -if 'discipline' is the right word in this context -is hotly contested; it is common ground that speculation about the nature of relations that would now be described as 'international' has a long history, in the Western tradition going back to classical Greece and Thucydides, but when that speculation crystallised into systematic study is another matter. 1 Committee, 'Why is there no international theory?', was that political theory is resolutely state-centric and has been since Plato, while 'international theory' is something different, marked not only by its paucity, but also by intellectual and moral poverty. 5 To be an 'international theorist' on his account it was necessary to address inter-state relations directly. As a result, many of the authors who would later feature very substantially in the International Political Theory of the 1980s and onwards -in particular Kant and Hegel -were given very short shrift indeed. In so far as Kant is read at all in this period it is as a utopian thinker; in 
The Rise of the 'Justice Industry' and of International Political Theory
The starting gun for this change was fired by the publication of John Rawls's A Theory of Justice, arguably, the most important work of Anglo-American political theory in the twentieth century. 10 The Theory of Justice is, on the face of it, a work of liberal analytical political philosophy, developing its ideas in a chain of reasoning from first principles but it also draws heavily on a reading of Kant and of the utilitarians. Though modern in its analytical method, it is a work of political philosophy that connects readily with the classics, not least by its ambition -this is a book which intends to tell us what justice is and, not, for example, simply how the word is used, the latter being the objective of most political philosophy in the mid-twentieth century. Because of its scope and ambition, and also, it has to be said because of its occasional obscurity, The Theory of Justice is a work that has attracted an enormous amount of commentary -the term 'justice industry' is barely an exaggeration -and a great deal of that commentary has focused on the international implications of his theory. Rawls did have some things to say about international relations, and would later elaborate his position in his short book of 1999, The Law of Peoples, but his main contribution to International Relations theory has been to provoke his critics to challenge his thinking in this area; 11 Kant's 'Perpetual Peace' came to be understood as an expression of that moral theory, rather than as simply another implausible peace project, which is how the previous generation of scholars had largely seen this work. 13 closer to a caricature, but still finds within 'Perpetual Peace' much more than did Hinsley or Wight. 16 Again, Mervyn Frost's 'constitutive theory' presents a picture of Hegel that many, probably most Hegelians would hardly recognise, but, again, his work represents a major advance on the crude characterisations of Hegel current a few years earlier. 17 What is noticeable here is that these authors were all scholars of international relations who turned themselves into historians of political thought because they wanted to say something that they found difficult to say from the starting point 
Political Science, International Relations and Political Theory
The rather unexpected pattern outlined above is at least partly explicable in terms of changes that were taking place in the wider discourse of American Political Science, in particular the increasing significance in this period of social choice theory, formal modelling and quantification, imported into Political Science from the disciplines of Economics and Econometrics. In this period from the mid-60s through to the mid-80s, 'political theory' became increasingly understood as formal theorising, on the explicit analogy of economic modelbuilding. And, just as most economists have very little interest in the history of their discipline, so most political scientists came to downplay the significance of the history of political thought and the study of the canon came to be marginalised. Of course, this was not a process that happened overnight or at an even rate everywhere; some of the most prestigious (and wealthy) universities continued to support the study of the history of political thought in much the same way that they supported the study of, for example, medieval philosophy and languages, that is as subjects of no practical significance, embodying an ethic of learning for its own sake. And, of course, there were pockets of resistance to the new learning from the left in the form of critical theorists such as Charles Taylor and William Connolly, and from Straussians on the right. 20 Still, within the American academy the rise of social choice thinking was inexorable, and came to include work in International Relations theory; rather surprisingly and somewhat against their own inclinations, the structural realism of Kenneth Waltz and his followers, and the liberal institutionalism of Robert Keohane and his, formed the basis for a social choice reorientation of this end of the Political Science discipline. 21 Returning to the focus of this essay, within this new dispensation the cosmopolitan critics of Rawls, along with at least some of their communitarian critics, found a relatively happy home; the kind of political theory they engaged in -liberal and analytic -was compatible with the kind of formal theorising that was now very highly valued in the discourse -but the history of international, as well as political, thought fell out of fashion.
Things were very different in the United Kingdom in this period. In the 1960s through to the 1980s most departments of politics and government in Britain, with the major exception of the Department of Government at Essex, were still largely oriented towards historical and institutional analysis and were resistant to the rise of formal theorising and quantification. 22 The study of politics was largely understood as an activity that fell within the Humanities, and in elite circles, in and out of academia, the division between the arts and the sciences and the overvaluing of the former at the expense of the latter outlined by C.P.
Snow in his account of 'the two cultures' still held. 23 In short, Political Studies in Britain was resistant to American trends, and to an extent still is, although there are now a much greater number of American-style Political Scientists, and Political Science Departments, in the UK than there once were.
Of equal importance in terms of the subject matter of this essay is the fact that in the United Kingdom International Relations has not necessarily been seen as a sub-field of Political Science in the way that is usually the case in the United 
International Political Theory and the History of Political Thought
International Political Theory emerged as a distinct discourse in the 1980s, distinct, that is, from both International Relations theory, which was becoming increasing defined in terms of causal theory and from Political Theory which was increasingly formal and abstract, divorced from the kind of historical research that had characterised earlier generations. In short, from the 1980s onwards three discourses existed in a field that once contained only two, but it is important to note that the boundaries between these three discourses were permeable and never clearly defined. Thus, for example, some 'classical' realists who rejected the neo-positivism of structural realism could easily be seen as International Political Theorists and, at the other end, as it were, of the new discourse, analytical political theorists who addressed international issues might well also turn their minds towards domestic topics -Charles Beitz comes to mind in this context, the writer of a seminal book on Political Theory and International Relations but also of works on democratic theory. 25 Also, some topics were such that all three discourses were engaged at one time or another -'human rights' would be the most obvious example here, and also perhaps the The point about International Political Theory, which applies even if the discourse were to be more loosely defined than it is above, is that it provides a home for work in the history of international thought that neither of the other two discourses can offer. Initially, as noted previously, much of this work came Theory, but someone who, if he could be brought to self-identify, would most likely simply describe himself as a political philosopher. 26 It is also important not to disregard some of the less intellectual factors that lead to the growth of International Political Theory, especially in the UK in the 1980s -Pierre Bourdieu's study of Homo Academicus may have focused on French intellectuals, but the basic point that developments in academic life are rarely simply driven by intellectual factors hold more widely. 27 The 80s were a time of great financial stringency for Universities in the UK, and academic posts in political theory were very hard to find; International Relations, on the other hand, was booming, led by student demand -predictably, the result was that young scholars who, as political theorists, found themselves virtually in the language of contemporary economics, there is a solid demand for high quality work that brings together International Relations theory and the history of political thought and a plentiful supply of high-quality works that meet this demand-but this is a niche market, no longer at the centre of the discourse of International Relations. To return to the question that opened this essay, the history of political thought has a great deal to contribute to the study of international relations, and indeed is already making a substantial contributionbut the audience for this work is relatively limited, and will remain so all the while that the high ground of the discipline is occupied by formal theorists and quantifiers.
